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a b s t r a c t
The social value of risk reduction (SVRR) is the marginal social value of reducing an individual’s fatality risk, as measured by some social welfare function (SWF). This Article
investigates SVRR, using a lifetime utility model in which individuals are differentiated
by age, lifetime income proﬁle, and lifetime risk proﬁle. We consider both the utilitarian SWF and a “prioritarian” SWF, which applies a strictly increasing and strictly concave
transformation to individual utility.
We show that the prioritarian SVRR provides a rigorous basis in economic theory for
the “fair innings” concept, proposed in the public health literature: as between an older
individual and a similarly situated younger individual (one with the same income and risk
proﬁle), a risk reduction for the younger individual is accorded greater social weight even
if the gains to expected lifetime utility are equal. The comparative statics of prioritarian
and utilitarian SVRRs with respect to age, and to (past, present, and future) income and
baseline survival probability, are signiﬁcantly different from the conventional value per
statistical life (VSL). Our empirical simulation based upon the U.S. population survival curve
and income distribution shows that prioritarian SVRRs with a moderate degree of concavity
in the transformation function conform to widely held views regarding lifesaving policies:
the young should take priority but income should make no difference.
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the
CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1. Introduction

We’ll build on the suggestion of Bognar (2015) in using
the term “fair innings” to mean the following: as between a
policy that produces a given gain in expected lifetime wellbeing for a younger person, and an otherwise-identical
policy that produces the same gain in expected lifetime
well-being for an older person, it is ethically better for
society to undertake the ﬁrst policy.
While fair innings in this sense is an intuitively appealing idea, it is not supported by the current economic
literature regarding the valuation of lifesaving. That literature generally focuses on beneﬁt-cost analysis (BCA),
which is the dominant tool in governmental practice for
assessing fatality risk-reduction policies. The methodology of BCA does not support the idea that gains to the
young are socially more valuable than equal gains for the
old.6
In this Article, we examine the fair innings concept
as part of a broader analysis of the use of social welfare
functions (SWFs) to value risk reduction, and a comparison of the SWF framework to BCA. We show, in
particular, that “prioritarian” SWFs place greater weight on
gains to expected lifetime well-being accruing to younger
rather than older individuals. We thus demonstrate that
the fair innings concept has a rigorous basis in welfare
economics—speciﬁcally in the SWF framework, not BCA.
BCA appraises government policies by summing individuals’ monetary equivalents—an individual’s monetary
equivalent for a policy being the amount of money she
is willing to pay or accept for it, relative to the status
quo. In turn, the value per statistical life (VSL) is the
concept that captures how BCA values fatality risk reduction. VSL is the marginal rate of substitution between
an individual’s material resources (wealth, income, or
consumption) and survival probability in a period. Put differently, VSL is the coefﬁcient that translates a change in
someone’s survival probability into a monetary equivalent.
Individual i’s willingness to pay for a small improvement pi in survival probability is approximately VSLi ×
pi .
BCA, although now widespread, is controversial. A
different framework for evaluating policy—one that has
strong roots in economic theory and plays a major role
in various bodies of scholarship within economics—is
the social welfare function (SWF). The SWF framework
measures policy impacts in terms of interpersonally
comparable well-being, not monetary equivalents. Each
possible outcome is a vector of individual well-being numbers, and a given policy is a probability distribution over
such vectors. The SWF, abbreviated W(·), assigns a social
value to a policy P, W(P), in light of the probability distribution over outcomes and, thus, well-being vectors that P
corresponds to. On the SWF framework, see generally Adler
(2012, 2019); Blackorby et al. (2005, chs. 2–4); Bossert and
Weymark (2004); Weymark (2016).
In previous work (Adler et al. (2014)), we analyzed the
application of the SWF framework to risk policies and compared how it values risk reduction to VSL. The key construct

Is it socially more important to save the lives of younger
individuals, than to save the lives of the old? It seems
hard to dispute that younger individuals should take priority with respect to lifesaving measures to the extent that
age inversely correlates with life expectancy remaining,
at least if the younger and older individuals are similarly
situated with respect to the other determinants of wellbeing (health, income, etc.).5 If Anne is similarly situated
to Bob, except for being younger, and a given reduction in
Anne’s current mortality risk produces a larger increase in
her life expectancy than the same reduction in Bob’s, the
risk reduction for Anne seems socially more valuable.
But some have argued that the young should take priority with respect to lifesaving measures, and health policy
more generally, on fairness grounds—not merely on the
utilitarian basis that lifesaving measures directed at the
young tend to yield a greater increase in life expectancy
and expected lifetime well-being. Harris (1985, p. 91) introduced the idea of “fair innings” into the public health
literature: “The fair innings argument requires that everyone be given an equal chance to have a fair innings, to
reach the appropriate threshold but, having reached it, they
have received their entitlement. The rest of their life is the
sort of bonus which may be canceled when this is necessary to help others reach the threshold.” Others who have
endorsed some version of the fair innings concept include
Williams (1997); Daniels (1988); Lockwood (1988); Nord
(2005); Bognar (2008, 2015); Ottersen (2013). The notion
that the young should receive priority with respect to lifesaving measures is reﬂected, not merely in the academic
literature on fair innings, but also in surveys of citizen preferences regarding health policy. (Bognar, 2008; Dolan et al.,
2005; Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2012).
Bognar (2015, p. 254) uses the following thought experiment to crystallize the fair innings concept.
[Y]ou have only one drug and there are two patients who
need it. The only difference between the two patients is
their age. . . . You have to choose between saving: (C) a
20-year old patient who will live for 10 more years if
she gets the drug; or (D) a 70-year old patient who will
live for 10 more years if she gets the drug.
Both patients would spend the remaining ten years of
their life in good health. So there is no difference in
expected beneﬁt. The only difference is how much they
have already lived when they receive the beneﬁt.
. . . [According to] the fairness-based argument for the
fair innings view, you should . . . prefer C to D.

5
More precisely, this proposition is hard to dispute for those who
endorse welfarism: who believe that governmental policies should be evaluated in light of the sum total and distribution of individual well-being.
By contrast, non-welfarists might argue that everyone has an equal right
to life, and that governments should not differentially value lifesaving on
the basis of any individual characteristics (including age).
This Article presupposes welfarism. Welfarism is the dominant ethical
view in economics, and both of the assessment frameworks we consider
in this article—the social-welfare-function framework and beneﬁt-costanalysis—are versions of welfarism. (On welfarism, see generally Adler
(2012, 2019).)

6
See below, Section 3, explaining why BCA does not support fair
innings.
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in our analysis was the social value of risk reduction (SVRR).
The SVRR for individual i is the social value per unit of
risk reduction to individual i, calculated for a marginal
such reduction—social value as captured by the SWF W(·).
SVRRi is just ∂W , and the change in the SWF that occurs

ity for the Young.” By contrast, VSLi does not have either
property.7
Section 4 analyzes the comparative statics of SVRRi and
VSLi with respect to income and baseline risk. Section 5
undertakes an empirical exercise, based on the U.S. population survival curve and income distribution, to illustrate
the SVRRi concept and to estimate the impact of age and
income on SVRRi and VSLi .
Our headline results are as follows. First, we demonstrate that the SWF framework—by contrast with
BCA—provides a rigorous basis for the “fair innings”
concept. The social value of risk reduction (SVRR), as
calculated using an ex ante or ex post prioritarian SWF,
gives extra social weight to risk reduction for younger
individuals above and beyond the additional weight they
receive in virtue of greater life expectancy remaining. (In
an important article, Williams (1997) proposes to operationalize the “fair innings” concept via a non-utilitarian
SWF applied to individuals’ quality-adjusted life expectancies; but Williams does not develop this proposal formally,
as we do here.)
Second, we show that the manner in which BCA values risk reduction is signiﬁcantly different from the SWF
framework, regardless of which SWF is used (utilitarian, ex
ante prioritarian, ex post prioritarian). These differences
are multifold. The prioritarian SVRRs display Priority for the
Young and Ratio Priority for the Young, while VSL does not.
Further, as established in Section 4, the comparative statics
of VSL with respect to income and baseline risk are different
not only from the ex ante and ex post prioritarian SVRRs,
but also from the utilitarian SVRR. Finally, Section 5 demonstrates that these analytic differences may be empirically
quite signiﬁcant. In particular, VSL increases much more
steeply with income in each age group than the utilitarian
SVRR, while the prioritarian SVRRs are ﬂat or decrease with
income.8
The text of the Article sets forth our analytic apparatus,
deﬁnes relevant concepts, states our analytic results (as
numbered propositions), and interprets these ﬁndings or
explains the intuition behind them. However, so as to limit
the length of the Article and increase readability, we do not
include proofs of these propositions in the text. Instead,
proofs are provided in an on-line Appendix.
This Article was drafted prior to the coronavirus pandemic of 2020. How to choose fatality-risk-reduction
policies was an important topic before the pandemic, and
will remain so after the pandemic abates. But the terrible
events of 2020 underscore the signiﬁcance of the questions
we address here. One issue that quickly became salient as
Covid-19 cases exploded was risk allocation. Which Covid19 patients should take priority in receiving scarce medical

∂pi

with a change pi in individual i’s survival probability pi is
approximately SVRRi × pi .
Using the simple, one-period model that is often
employed in the literature on VSL, Adler et al. (2014)
calculated SVRRi for different types of SWFs: the utilitarian, “ex ante prioritarian,” and “ex post prioritarian”
SWFs. (Utilitarianism ranks outcomes by summing wellbeing numbers, while prioritarianism does so by summing
a strictly increasing and strictly concave transformation of
well-being, thereby giving priority to those at lower wellbeing levels. The idea of utilitarianism dates back hundreds
of years to the writings of Jeremy Bentham; prioritarianism is a more recent concept, pioneered by the moral
philosopher Derek Parﬁt (2000). The ex ante and ex post
prioritarian SWFs are two distinct speciﬁcations of prioritarianism for the case of uncertainty.) We analyzed the
comparative statics of SVRRi and VSLi with respect to individual wealth and baseline risk.
The current Article signiﬁcantly expands the analysis of
Adler et al. (2014). We use a much richer model of individual resources and survival. An individual’s life has multiple
periods, up to a maximum T (e.g., 100 years). Each individual is characterized by a lifetime risk proﬁle (a probability of
surviving to the end of each period, conditional on her being
alive at its beginning); a lifetime income proﬁle (an income
amount which she earns in each period if she survives to its
end); and a current age. This multi-period setup permits a
more nuanced analysis of SVRRi and VSLi . In particular, we
can now examine the comparative statics of SVRRi and VSLi
with respect to an individual’s age as well as with respect
to (past, present and future) income and baseline fatality
risk.
The SWF framework is widely used in some areas of
economics, such as optimal tax theory and climate economics. (Overviews of the use of the SWF framework in
these two literatures are provided by Tuomala (2016) and
Botzen and van den Bergh (2014) respectively.) It is also
employed in health economics, with the SWF here typically being applied to a population characterized in terms of
longevity and health states. (Bleichrodt et al., 2004; Dolan,
1998; Hougaard et al., 2013; Østerdal, 2005; Williams,
1997.) However, little research has been undertaken applying the SWF framework to the policy domain of fatality risk
reduction—a major arena of governmental policymaking
(Graham, 2008). We aim to make headway in exploring this
important and understudied topic, and to raise its proﬁle
in the research community.
Section 2 sets forth the model and the SWFs we will consider. Section 3 analyzes the comparative statics of SVRRi
and VSLi with respect to age. We provide a formal statement of the fair innings concept, via properties which we
term “Priority for the Young” and “Ratio Priority for the
Young.” We show that the ex ante prioritarian SVRRi and ex
post prioritarian SVRRi both display Priority for the Young
and indeed the logically stronger property of “Ratio Prior-

7
The utilitarian SVRR also does not display Priority for the Young and
Ratio Priority for the Young, but this is true by deﬁnition—since these
properties are deﬁned relative to a utilitarian baseline. See Section 3.
8
The properties of the ex ante prioritarian and ex post prioritarian
SVRRs depend, to some extent, on which concave transformation function is used—embodying the degree of priority for the worse off. Thus, in
Section 5, the prioritarian SVRRs with a moderately concave transformation function are ﬂat with income, while the prioritarian SVRRs with a
more concave transformation function decrease with income.
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alive at the beginning of period t*. In particular, i (t; Ai ) is
individual i’s probability of surviving to the end of period
t of her life, conditional on being alive at the beginning of
period Ai —that is, her probability of surviving to the end
of period t, conditional on her current age (Ai ). If t < Ai ,
t
i (t; Ai ) = 1. If t ≥ Ai , i (t; Ai ) = s=Ai pi (s).
Finally, let i (t; t*) denote individual i’s probability of
living exactly t periods, conditional on being alive at the
beginning of period t*. That is, i (t; t*) is the probability,
conditional on being alive at the beginning of period t*, of
surviving through the end of period t and then dying before
the end of the next period. In particular, i (t; Ai ) is the individual’s probability of living exactly t periods, conditional
on being alive at the beginning of period Ai —conditional on
her current age.
If t < (Ai − 1), i (t; Ai ) = 0. If t = (Ai −1), i (t; Ai ) is the
individual’s probability, conditional on her current age, of
not surviving the current period and instead living exactly
(Ai − 1) periods. That is i (Ai − 1; Ai ) = 1 − pi (Ai ). Finally, if
t ≥ Ai , we have that: i (t; Ai ) = i (t; Ai )(1 − pi (t + 1)).
The earnings process is as follows: if an individual survives to the end of period t, she earns an income amount
yi (t) > 0. Individual i, thus, is characterized by a vector of
incomes, (yi (1), . . ., yi (T))—her “income proﬁle.” An individual’s income proﬁle, like her risk proﬁle, is (in our model)
given to the individual at birth and does not change as she
ages.12
Period consumption, like period income, is modelled
as occurring only if the individual survives to the end of
the period. An individual’s consumption during period t,
if she survives to the end of period t, is denoted ci (t). We
assume “myopic” consumption: ci (t) = yi (t). The individual
consumes in each period whatever she earns then, rather
than saving earnings for future consumption or ﬁnancing
consumption by borrowing against future earnings.
“Myopic” consumption might occur because of imperfect markets—the individual lacks access to the ﬁnancial
instruments enabling her to save and borrow—or because
of myopic thinking on the individual’s part. Given length
constraints, we do not here analyze SVRRi with a multi-

equipment that would reduce the risk of dying from the
disease, such as ventilators? Which uninfected individuals should go to the front of the line in receiving scarce
protective equipment, such as N95 masks? The SWF framework provides a systematic methodology for answering
such questions. It gives guidance in determining how the
social value of reducing an individual’s fatality risk (in these
cases, her risk of dying from Covid-19) should vary, or not,
depending upon her age, income, and other characteristics.
Understanding these relative social valuations, for three
major SWFs—utilitarian, ex ante prioritarian, and ex post
prioritarian—is precisely the topic of this Article.
2. Conceptual framework
2.1. Model of the population
There is a population of N individuals. The life of a given
individual i is divided into periods 1, 2, . . ., t, . . ., T, with T
the maximum number of periods that any individual can
live. Each individual is characterized by an age, risk proﬁle,
and income proﬁle, to be explained momentarily.
Calendar time is divided into the present time (also
referred to as the “current” time), earlier times (“the past”),
and later times (“the future”). This enables us to endow
each individual i with an “age,” denoted as Ai . We assume
that individuals’ periods are synchronized, such that the
present time is the beginning of some period for each of the
N individuals. Ai is the number of the present period for
individual i. For example, if Betty has already lived 4 periods, and the present time is the beginning of period 5 of
Betty’s life, then ABetty = 5, i.e., Betty’s “age” is 5.9 Ai ≤ T and
we also assume that Ai ≥ 2.10
Death and survival are conceptualized as follows. Consider a given individual i and some period t in her life.
Assuming the individual is alive at the beginning of period
t, she may either die before the period ends, or survive to
the end of the period (equivalently, be alive at the beginning of the following period). Let pi (t) denote individual i’s
probability of surviving to the end of period t, conditional
on being alive at the beginning of period t. We’ll generally refer to pi (t) as a “survival probability.” Individual i is
characterized by a vector of such probabilities, one for each
period up to T—for short, her “risk proﬁle.”
In our model, these probabilities do not change as the
individual ages. Individual i is endowed at birth with survival probabilities for each period t = 1, . . ., T; and pi (t) at
the present time, the beginning of period Ai , is this at-birth
probability.11
Let i (t; t*) denote individual i’s probability of surviving to the end of period t of her life, conditional on being

course would be to conceptualize pi (t) as the currently known conditional
probability of i’s surviving period t, given that she is alive at the beginning
of that period. On this approach, pi (t) = 1 for t < Ai , since i knows she has
survived to the beginning of period Ai . Modelling fatality risks this way
would not change our results, since the formulas for the utilitarian, ex ante
prioritarian, and ex post prioritarian SVRRs, and for VSL, do not depend
upon past survival probabilities; and because currently known survival
probabilities for the present and future periods are the same as at-birth
survival probabilities (see Appendix).
We assume 0 < pi (t) < 1 for all t such that 1 < t ≤ T; and that pi (1) =
1. As discussed below, note 22, we assume that Ai ≥ 2 for all i—that is,
that every individual has survived to the end of the ﬁrst period of her
life—and to ensure this we assume pi (1) = 1. Finally, pi (T + 1) = 0. (This is
the probability that i survives one more period, given that she has survived
to the end of period T, the maximum number of possible periods.)
12
Of course, if t and t* are distinct periods, then it may well be the case
/ yi (t*). But the proﬁle of incomes (yi (1), . . ., yi (T))—specifying,
that yi (t) =
for each period, what the individual will earn at the end of that period if
she survives to that point—does not itself change as the individual ages.

9
Note that our deﬁnition of individual i’s “age” as Ai is slightly different
from the colloquial use of the term “age.” If Betty is at the beginning of
period 5 of her life, then (colloquially) we would say that her age is 4, not
5. However, we need a natural-language term to refer to Ai , and “age” is
the most natural choice. The issue here is purely semantic. Referring to Ai
as individual i’s “age” rather than “age plus one” makes no difference to
our analytic results.
10
See below, note 22, for an explanation why we assume that Ai ≥ 2.
11
A different way to model an individual’s fatality risks over the life
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probability in period t with policy P and yiP (t) is her period
t income with policy P.
The SWF framework has three components: an interpersonally comparable well-being measure, which converts
each possible outcome (a possible social consequence) into
a vector of well-being numbers, one for each of the persons
in the population; a rule for ranking well-being vectors; and
an uncertainty module, namely a procedure for applying
the rule to policies understood as probability distributions
across outcomes. (Adler, 2012, 2019.) If individuals have a
common utility function, then the well-being measure can
be equated with that utility function (which is the approach
we follow here). (Adler, 2019, ch. 3, app. D.) In what follows,
we use “SWF” to mean the combination of a rule for ranking well-being vectors and an uncertainty module for that
rule.
We consider three SWFs: the utilitarian SWF, the ex ante
prioritarian SWF, and the ex post prioritarian SWF. Each
assigns a score (a real number) to a given policy P, and ranks
policies in the order of these scores. We’ll denote the utilitarian SWF as WU (·), the ex ante prioritarian SWF as WEAP (·),
and the ex post prioritarian SWF as WEPP (·)—or, more compactly, as WU , WEAP , and WEPP . We’ll use W(·) as a generic
term to indicate any SWF, with W(·) then speciﬁed as WU ,
WEAP , WEPP , or as some other SWF.18
The utilitarian rule ranks well-being vectors according to the sum of well-being. The standard procedure for
applying the utilitarian rule under uncertainty is to sum
individuals’ expected well-being. This yields the utilitarian
SWF.

period model and individual saving and borrowing. This is
an important topic for future research.13
Individuals have a common lifetime utility function U(·),
deﬁned as the discounted sum of period utility. Let u(·) be
the common period utility function and ␤ = 1/(1 + ϕ), ϕ
≥ 0 the constant utility discount rate. Ui (s) denotes the
individual’s
utility if she lives exactly s periods.
s lifetime
t u(y (t)).14 We assume that u(·) is twice difUi (s) =
ˇ
i
t=1
ferentiable and that u (·) > 0, u (·) < 0.
Note that the above formula for lifetime utility includes
a term for a given period t iff15 the individual survives to
the end of the period. If she doesn’t survive to the end of a
given period, her period utility is zero. Further, our analysis
presupposes that, if i does survive to the end of period t,
with consumption ci (t) in that period, u(ci (t)) > 0. Note that
if u(ci (t)) < 0, increasing pi (t) may have the effect of lowering
i’s expected lifetime utility. We wish to focus here on the
case in which risk reduction is beneﬁcial to individuals—not
the unusual case in which it may be harmful.16
We use Vi to denote the expected lifetime utility of
individual i, given his age, risk proﬁle, and income proﬁle.
T
Vi =
 (t; Ai )Ui (t). This formula for Vi is straightt=A −1 i
i

forward. Given that i is alive at the beginning of period
Ai , the possible lifespans for him are (Ai −1), Ai , . . ., T.
The immediately preceding formula aggregates over these
possible lifespans, calculating the lifetime utility for each
possible lifespan and multiplying each possible lifetime
utility Ui (t) by its probability. A different formula for Vi ,
useful in calculations, can also be derived (see Appendix).
Ai −1 t
T
Vi =
ˇ u(yi (t)) +
 (t; Ai )ˇt u(yi (t)). This fort=1
t=A i
i

mula takes each period of i’s life, 1, . . ., T; calculates the
discounted period utility for that period; multiplies by the
probability of i surviving to the end of that period, conditional on his current age;17 and sums up over all the
periods.

Deﬁnition 1a.

The Utilitarian SWF: W U (P) =

N

VP
i=1 i

The prioritarian rule ranks well-being vectors according to the sum of a strictly increasing and strictly concave
transformation of individual well-being. Let g(·) denote
some strictly increasing and strictly concave function.
By summing g(·)-transformed well-being numbers, the
prioritarian rule has the effect of giving greater weight
to well-being changes affecting worse-off individuals.
Assume that in well-being vector w a better-off individual
is at well-being level wH , and a worse-off individual is at
well-being level wL , with wH > wL . Let w > 0 be a change in
well-being. Well-being vector w* is identical to w, except
that the better-off person is at well-being level wH + w.
Well-being vector w** is identical to w, except that the
worse-off person is at well-being level wL + w. The utilitarian rule is indifferent between w* and w**, while the
prioritarian rule prefers w**, by virtue of the strict concavity of g(·). It prefers to give a ﬁxed increment in well-being
to a worse-off person rather than to a better-off one.
The two main approaches to applying the prioritarian
rule under uncertainty are ex ante prioritarianism and ex

2.2. Social welfare functions (SWFs)
We’ll use the term “policy” to mean some course of
action or inaction by the government. The status quo,
therefore, is a “policy”: government chooses not to change
individuals’ risk proﬁles or income proﬁles. A policy
intervention, relative to the status quo, is also a “policy”: government changes individuals’ risk proﬁles and/or
income proﬁles, speciﬁcally by changing present survival
probabilities, future survival probabilities, present income
amounts, and/or future income amounts. An individual’s
risk proﬁle or income proﬁle with a given policy P is
denoted with the superscript “P.” Thus pPi (t) is i’s survival

13
In the working paper upon which the current Article is based, we do
address the topic of SVRRi with saving and borrowing, although do not
undertake a comprehensive analysis. See Adler et al. (2019).
14
Since consumption occurs at the end of each period, the discount rate
␤ is raised to the power t rather than (t−1).
15
“iff” means “if and only if.”
16
In order to ensure that u(ci (t)) > 0 for all i and t, we assume that there
is a “subsistence” level of consumption czero such that u(czero ) = 0 and that
yi (t) > czero for all i, t.
17
As noted above, if t < Ai , then i (t; Ai ) = 1.

18
SVRRi for a given W(·) is the partial derivative of W(·) with respect
to i’s current survival probability. See Section 2.3. In order for this partial
derivative to be well-deﬁned, the SWF needs to be score-based, as are
WU , WEAP , and WEPP (assigning a real number to each policy and ranking
policies in the order of those numbers), and indeed differentiable, as are
WU , WEAP , and WEPP given the model here.
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post prioritarianism.19 (Adler, 2012, ch. 7; Adler, 2019, app.
J; Adler et al., 2014.) Ex ante prioritarianism assigns a score
to a given policy by calculating expected well-being for
each individual; applying the transformation function, g(·),
to each individual’s expected well-being; and then summing up these g(·)-transformed well-being expectations.
Ex post prioritarianism assigns a score to a given policy by
taking the expected value, for each individual, of her g(·)transformed well-being; and summing up these expected
transformed well-being numbers.20 In a nutshell, the ex
ante prioritarian formula is the sum across individuals of
transformed expected well-being, while the ex post prioritarian formula is the sum across individuals of expected
transformed well-being.
Ex ante and ex post prioritarianism each have a central place in the literature on prioritarianism because each
has axiomatic advantages compared to the other. It can
be shown that no procedure for applying the prioritarian
rule under uncertainty can satisfy both the ex ante Pareto
axioms, and a very plausible axiom of stochastic dominance. Ex ante prioritarianism satisﬁes the ex ante Pareto
axioms, but violates stochastic dominance; ex post prioritarianism satisﬁes stochastic dominance, but violates the
ex ante Pareto axioms.21 (Utilitarianism satisﬁes the ex
ante Pareto axioms and stochastic dominance, but lacks the
extra weighting for the worse off that is characteristic of
prioritarianism, and that its proponents ﬁnd to be ethically
attractive.)
In the model here, the formulas for ex ante and ex post
prioritarianism are as follows.

of SWFs. The choice of a particular strictly increasing and
strictly concave g(·) deﬁnes a speciﬁc WEAP and WEPP . Our
analysis will be generic, holding true for any g(·). We do
assume that g(·) is twice differentiable, so that g (·) > 0 and
g (·) < 0.22
Note that all three SWFs are deﬁned in terms of individuals’ lifetime well-being. WU calculates each individual’s
expected lifetime well-being, and sums across individuals. WEAP calculates each individual’s transformed expected
lifetime well-being, and sums across individuals. WEPP
calculates each individual’s expected transformed lifetime
well-being, and sums across individuals. The application of
SWFs to lifetime well-being has a strong ethical justiﬁcation. (Adler, 2012, ch. 6). While much of the SWF literature
uses one-period models for reasons of tractability, there is
also a signiﬁcant body of work using multiperiod or lifetime numbers as the input to an SWF.23 (For discussion of
this literature, see Adler (2012, p. 245); Boadway (2012, pp.
86–106); Tuomala (2016, pp. 360–64).)
2.3. The social value of risk reduction (SVRR)
We’ll use the “O” superscript to denote an individual’s
status quo income and risk proﬁles: pi O (t) is individual i’s
status quo survival probability for period t and yi O (t) her
status quo income for period t.
Assume that government enacts a policy intervention,
relative to the status quo, at the beginning of the current
period. Among other effects, the policy may change individual i’s current survival probability. Let pi be this change:
i’s current survival probability in the status quo is pi O (Ai )
and her current survival probability after the intervention
is pi O (Ai ) + pi .
We can now deﬁne SVRRi , which will be useful in understanding the impact of this policy intervention on social
welfare.

Deﬁnition 1b. The Ex Ante Prioritarian SWF: W EAP (P) =

N
P

g(Vi ), with g(·) a strictly increasing and strictly coni=1
cave function.

Deﬁnition 1c. The Ex Post Prioritarian SWF: W EPP (P) =
N T
P (t; Ai )g(UiP (t)), with g(·) a strictly increasi=1
t=A −1 i
i

Deﬁnition 2. The Social Value of Risk Reduction
(SVRRi ): SVRRi for a given SWF W(·) is the partial derivative
∂W evaluated at i’s status quo risk and income proﬁle.24

ing and strictly concave function.
The utilitarian SWF is a speciﬁc SWF (a speciﬁc formula
for ranking policies as a function of individuals’ ages, risk
proﬁles, and income proﬁles) while the ex ante prioritarian SWF and ex post prioritarian SWF are, each, families

∂pi (Ai )

22
The “Atkinson” family of g(·) functions—g(u) = (1−␥)−1 u1− , ␥ > 0, ␥
=
/ 1; and g(u) = ln u if ␥ = 1—have attractive axiomatic properties and are
regularly used in the economic literature on prioritarianism. See Adler
(2012, ch. 5). (Indeed our empirical exercise in Section 5 uses an Atkinson
g(·) function.) The Atkinson g(·) is such that g(0) is undeﬁned for ␥ ≥ 1. In
order for our analysis to accommodate the possibility that g(0) is undeﬁned, we assume that Ai ≥ 2 for all i. (Note that the expression for the
ex post prioritarian SWF in Deﬁnition 1c includes the g(·) value of individual i’s lifetime well-being if she lives exactly (Ai − 1) periods. If Ai = 1,
the individual’s lifetime well-being if she lives exactly Ai − 1 periods is 0.)
Because the period length can be arbitrarily short, the assumption that Ai
≥ 2 is not signiﬁcantly restrictive.
23
Similarly, while much empirical work on income inequality focuses
on annual income, there is also a signiﬁcant body of work that looks at
the inequality of lifetime income. See, for example, Bönke et al. (2015);
Bowlus and Robin (2004); Guvenen et al. (2017); Huggett et al. (2011);
Nilsen et al. (2012).
24
Formally,SVRRi = ∂p∂W
(pOi (1), ..., pOi (T ); yiO (1), ..., yiO (T )). Since all
(A )

19
The choice between ex ante and ex post approaches to equity has also
been discussed in health economics. (Bleichrodt, 1997).
20
The rule for ex post prioritarianism is often stated in a different way:
as the expected value of the sum of individuals’ transformed well-being.
But this is mathematically equivalent to the rule stated in the text: the
expected value of the sum of individuals’ transformed well-being equals
the sum of individuals’ expected transformed well-being. (Adler, 2019,
app. J).
21
The ex ante Pareto axioms are Ex Ante Pareto Indifference and Ex
Ante Strong Pareto. Ex Ante Pareto Indifference: If each person’s expected
well-being with policy P is equal to her expected well-being with policy
P*, then P and P* are equally good. Ex Ante Strong Pareto: If each person’s
expected well-being with policy P is greater than or equal to her expected
well-being with policy P*, and at least one person’s expected well-being
is strictly greater, then P is better than P*. Stochastic Dominance: If, for
each possible state of nature, the well-being vector produced by policy P
in that state is better than the well-being vector produced by policy P*,
then P is better than P*. On the axiomatic properties of utilitarianism and
prioritarianism under uncertainty, see generally Adler, 2012 ch. 7; Adler,
2019 ch. 3–4, apps. I-L.

i

i

three SWFs are additively separable across individuals,

∂W
∂pi (Ai )

can be

expressed just as a function of i’s risk and income proﬁles; the value of
this partial derivative does not depend upon other individuals’ risks and
incomes.
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By the total differential approximation from calculus,
the change in social welfare resulting from pi is approximately SVRRi × pi .25
Intuitively, SVRRi is the change in social welfare per
unit of current risk reduction for individual i, as calculated
for a marginal such reduction. To be sure, a governmental policy intervention may well have effects other than
changing individuals’ current survival probabilities. It may
also change their survival probabilities in future periods.
And a risk-reduction intervention will surely have costs,
which will be reﬂected in a change to individuals’ current
and/or future incomes. The total effect of a policy intervention on social welfare will be approximately equal to the
sum, across individuals, of SVRRi × pi plus corresponding terms for changes to future survival probabilities and to
incomes. SVRRi captures that portion of a policy intervention’s total impact on social welfare that results from the
change to individual i’s current survival probability.
Further, by comparing SVRRi to SVRRj , for two individuals i and j—as we do below—we can determine the relative
social impact of risk reductions for the two. Consider a
change p to someone’s current survival probability. That
risk change, if accruing to individual i, results in a change
of social welfare by approximately SVRRi × p. If accruing
to individual j, it results in a change of social welfare by
approximately SVRRj × p. Thus (for a small p) the ﬁrst
social welfare change is larger than/smaller than/equal to
the second iff SVRRi is larger than/smaller than/equal to
SVRRj .
SVRRi is deﬁned (Deﬁnition 2) as the partial derivative of
the SWF with respect to individual i’s current survival probability, with this partial derivative evaluated at individual
i’s status quo risk and income proﬁles. This reference to the
status quo doesn’t limit the generality of the deﬁnition. For
any assignment of income and risk proﬁles to individuals,
we can take that assignment as the status quo and consider
the social welfare impact of policy interventions relative to
that baseline.
As a notational matter, we’ll also denote SVRRi for a
generic SWF W(·) as Si ; and SVRRi for WU , WEAP , and WEPP
speciﬁcally as (respectively) SiU , SiEAP , and SiEPP .
Using the deﬁnition of SVRRi and of the SWFs (Deﬁnitions 1a, 1b, 1c), it is straightforward to calculate SiU , SiEAP ,
and SiEPP .26
Proposition 1a.
Proposition 1b.

SiU = −UiO (Ai − 1) +

T

O (t;Ai )
i

t=Ai pO (A )
i
i

Proposition 1c.
+

T

O (t;Ai )
i
t=Ai pO (A )
i
i

SiEPP = −g(UiO (Ai − 1))

g(UiO (t))

We can provide intuitive explanations for these formulas, beginning with the utilitarian SVRRi . Observe that SiU is
equal to the difference between (1) individual i’s expected
lifetime well-being conditional on surviving the current
period, i.e.,

T

O (t;Ai )
i

t=Ai pO (A )
i
i

UiO (t), and (2) her realized lifetime

well-being if she dies during the current period (does not
survive it), i.e., UiO (Ai − 1).
Consider the simple case in which individual i would die
for certain during the current period, absent governmental intervention, and intervention ensures that she survives
the period. In this case, clearly, the change in utilitarian
social welfare that results from the intervention is the
difference between individual i’s expected lifetime wellbeing conditional on surviving the current period, and her
realized lifetime well-being if she dies during the current
period. For short, let’s term this difference the “utilitarian
gain from saving individual i.”
More generally, consider a policy which increases individual i’s current survival probability by pi . The change
in utilitarian social welfare that results from the pi
increase is just pi multiplied by the utilitarian gain
from saving individual i. Thus SiU , the marginal change
in utilitarian social welfare per unit of current-period
risk reduction for individual i, is nothing other than
−UiO (Ai − 1) +

T

O (t;Ai )
i

t=Ai pO (A )
i
i

UiO (t): the utilitarian gain from

saving individual i.
The formula for the ex ante prioritarian SVRRi , SiEAP ,
is the utilitarian SVRRi multiplied by a weighting factor,
g  (ViO ). This weighting factor is a function of the individual’s
expected lifetime well-being, and decreases as expected
lifetime well-being increases. It reﬂects the priority given
by the ex ante prioritarian SWF to individuals at lower levels of expected lifetime well-being.
Finally, the formula for the ex post prioritarian SVRRi ,
SiEPP , is the same as that for the utilitarian SVRRi , except that
transformed lifetime well-being, g(Ui ), is substituted for
lifetime well-being Ui . Consider the case in which individual i would die for certain during the current period, absent
governmental intervention, and intervention ensures that
she survives the period. In this case, the change in ex
post prioritarian social welfare that results from the intervention is the difference between individual i’s expected
transformed lifetime well-being conditional on surviving

UiO (t)

SiEAP = g  (ViO )SiU

the current period,

T

O (t;Ai )
i

t=Ai pO (A )
i
i

ized transformed lifetime well-being if she dies during the
current period, g(UiO (Ai − 1)). For short, let’s term this difference the “ex post prioritarian gain from saving individual
i.”
More generally, consider a policy which increases individual i’s current survival probability by pi . The change
in ex post prioritarian social welfare that results from the
pi increase is just pi multiplied by the ex post prioritarian gain from saving individual i. Thus SiEPP , the marginal
change in ex post prioritarian social welfare per unit of

25

Assume that a policy intervention changes individual i’s current survival probability by pi ; her survival probability in period t by pi t , with
t > Ai ; and her income in period t by yi t , with t ≥ Ai . Then, by the totaldifferential
 approximation from calculus, W is approximately equal
to:



pti +

i

SVRRi × pi +

T

T

∂W
(pOi (1), ..., pOi (T ); yiO (1), ..., yiO (T ))
t=Ai +1 ∂pi (t)

∂W
(pOi (1), ..., pOi (T ); yiO (1), ..., yiO (T ))
t=Ai ∂yi (t)



g(UiO (t)), and her real-

×

× yit

26

We remind the reader that proofs of numbered propositions can be
found in the on-line Appendix.
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current-period risk reduction for individual i, is nothing
other than the ex post prioritarian gain from saving individual i.
Note that our assumption that u(yi (t)) > 0 for all i, t—it
is always better to survive a period than to die before its
end—ensures that SiU , SiEAP , and SiEPP > 0 for all i. Risk reduction is always a social beneﬁt—whether social beneﬁts are
calculated using a utilitarian, ex ante prioritarian, or ex post
prioritarian SWF.
It would be of interest to consider the relation between
SVRRi as deﬁned here and the partial derivative of the SWF
with respect to future survival probability. Given space constraints, we do not address this topic, and instead focus in
this Article on how the marginal social welfare impact of
changes to current survival probability varies among individuals as a function of their ages, income proﬁles, and risk
proﬁles.

The relation between VSLi and B is directly analogous to
the relation between SVRRi and W. Just as SVRRi = ∂W ,
so VSLi =

lyzed in Adler et al. (2014), and remains true in the lifetime
model under consideration here.
Proposition 2a.

Proposition 2b.

The value of statistical life (VSL) is standardly deﬁned as
the marginal rate of substitution between an individual’s
material resources (wealth, income, or consumption) and
survival probability. (Eeckhoudt and Hammitt, 2001; Evans
and Smith, 2006; Kaplow, 2005; Hammitt, 2007.)
Consistent with this general approach, we deﬁne VSLi
in our model as follows.

(T )).
Adler et al. (2014), using a one-period model, deﬁned VSL as the marginal
rate of substitution between wealth and survival probability. In the multiperiod model with myopic consumption that we use in this Article, an
individual’s wealth in each period is zero—she consumes what she earns
and saves nothing—and so VSL is here deﬁned as the marginal rate of
substitution between income (or equivalently, consumption) and survival
probability.
29
As in note 25 above, consider a policy intervention that changes
individual i’s current survival probability by pi ; her survival
probability in period t by pi t , with t > Ai ; and her income in
period t by yi t , with t ≥ Ai . Again using the total-differential
approximation
from calculus, B is approximately equal to:


proﬁle.28

27
Let
Vi (pi (1), ..., pi (T ); yi (1), ..., yi (T ))
denote
individual
i’s expected lifetime utility as a function of risk pro. . ., yi (T)).
ﬁle (pi (1), . . ., pi (T)) and income proﬁle (y
i (1),
Ai −1
is,
Vi (pi (1), ..., pi (T ); yi (1), ..., yi (T )) =
ˇt u(yi (t)) +
That
s=Ai

t=1

pi (s). Then MEi (P) = y

such that: Vi (pOi (1), ..., pOi (T ); yiO (1), ..., yiO (Ai − 1), yiO (Ai ) + y, yiO (Ai +
p

1), ..., yiO (T )) = Vi (pPi (1), ..., pPi (T ); yiP (1), ..., yiP (Ai ), ..., yi (T ))
Note that MEi (P), thus deﬁned, is individual i’s “equivalent variation” for
policy P. Sometimes, BCA is deﬁned instead as the sum of “compensating
variations.” (Boadway, 2016; Freeman, 2003, ch. 3.) There are theoretical
advantages to conceptualizing monetary equivalents for purposes of BCA
as equivalent variations rather than compensating variations. (Adler et al.,
2014, n. 8.) However, that choice is not signiﬁcant for purpose of this Article. Whether monetary equivalents are deﬁned as equivalent variations
B
. See Appendix.
or compensating variations, VSLi = ∂p∂(A
)
28

i

i

∂Vi
∂V
(pO (1), ..., pOi (T ); yiO (1), ..., yiO (T ))/ ∂y (Ai ) (pOi (1), ..., pOi (T ); yiO (1), ..., yiO
∂pi (Ai ) i
i i

The Value of Statistical Life (VSLi ): VSLi =

t

i

function of individual i’s risk proﬁle and income proﬁle, as in note 27
immediately above. Vi = Vi (pi (1), ..., pi (T ); yi (1), ..., yi (T )). Then VSLi =

∂Vi /∂pi (Ai )
, with these partial derivatives evaluated at i’s sta∂Vi /∂yi (Ai )

i (t; Ai )ˇt u(yi (t)), with i (t; Ai ) =

SU
pO (Ai )ˇAi u (yO (Ai ))

Given the formula for VSLi stated in Proposition 2b, it
can be observed that the comparative statics of VSLi and the
utilitarian SVRRi will be the same in the special case where
all individuals in the status quo have the same expected
marginal utility of current income. In that case, the denominator in this formula will be the same for all individuals, and
VSLi then equals SiU multiplied by a common positive constant. In general, however, relative to a generic status quo,
VSLi and SiU do not have the same comparative statics—as
our analysis in Sections 3 and 4 below will demonstrate.
If we posit a perfect tax system that redistributes
income so as to equalize individuals’ expected marginal

N

t=Ai

VSLi =

i

MEi (P),
Deﬁnition 3. Beneﬁt-Cost Analysis: B(P) =
i=1
with MEi (P) as formally deﬁned in the accompanying
footnote.27

T

∂B , with ∂B evaluated at i’s
∂pi (Ai )
∂pi (Ai )

Intuitively, VSLi is the marginal change in the sum of
monetary equivalents per unit of current risk reduction for
individual i, just as SVRRi is the marginal change in social
welfare per unit of current risk reduction for individual i.
Assume that a policy intervention changes individual i’s
current survival probability by pi . While the change in
social welfare resulting from this risk change is approximately SVRRi × pi , the change in the sum of monetary
equivalents is approximately VSLi × pi .29
From Deﬁnition 4, plus the formulas above for Vi and the
utilitarian SVRRi , it is straightforward to derive that VSLi
equals the utilitarian SVRRi (SiU ) divided by the expected
marginal utility of i’s current income.

BCA is an evaluation methodology that assigns a score
to each policy by summing up individuals’ monetary equivalents for that policy. (Adler, 2012, pp. 88–114; Boadway,
2016). In the model here, MEi (P), individual i’s monetary
equivalent for policy P, is the change to her current status
quo income that equalizes her expected utility as between
the policy and the status quo. We use B(·) to denote the BCA
methodology. B(P) is the score assigned by BCA to policy P:
the sum of monetary equivalents for P.

tus quo risk proﬁle and income

VSLi =

status quo income and risk proﬁles.

2.4. Beneﬁt-cost analysis (BCA) and the value of
statistical life (VSL)

Deﬁnition 4.

∂pi (Ai )
∂B . This was true in the one-period model ana∂pi (Ai )



i

VSLi × pi +

pti +

T

T

∂B
(pOi (1), ..., pOi (T ); yiO (1), ..., yiO (T ))
t=Ai +1 ∂pi (t)

∂B
(pOi (1), ..., pOi (T ); yiO (1), ..., yiO (T ))
t=Ai ∂yi (t)



× yit

×

. The terms

in this equation for the partial derivative of B(·) with respect to survival
probability in a future period t—that is ∂p∂B(t) , t > Ai —can also be related to
i

VSLi . It can be shown that each such term equals VSLi multiplied by the
marginal rate of substitution with respect to Vi between present survival
probability and survival probability in period t.

i

To state this deﬁnition more formally, let Vi be expressed as a
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utilities of (after-tax) present income, then the comparative
statics of VSLi and SiU will be the same. Observe, here, that
equalizing incomes does not necessarily equalize expected
marginal utilities of after-tax present income—since, for
example, two individuals of the same age with the same
after-tax present income but differing survival probabilities for the current period will have different expected
marginal utilities.
A terminological note. We use the terms “SVRRi ” and
“VSLi ” as the names for the concepts deﬁned in Deﬁnitions
2 and 4 so as to emphasize that SVRRi and VSLi values are
individual-speciﬁc. In general, given two distinct individuals i and j, it need not be the case that SVRRi = SVRRj and it
need not be the case VSLi =VSLj . However, in what follows,
so as to reduce clutter, we regularly drop the “i” subscript
and use “SVRR” and “VSL” as shorthand, respectively, for
“SVRRi ” and “VSLi .”

period). This increment to expected lifetime well-being
with respect to periods Aj , Aj +1, . . ., Ai − 1 does not occur if
we increase the older individual’s survival probability, since
he has already survived those periods.
The second term in the formula above (for short, the
“risk term”) is negative. By increasing either individual’s
current survival probability, we increase that individual’s
chance of surviving periods Ai , Ai + 1, . . ., T in his or her life,
and thereby increase his or her chance of accruing consumption utility with respect to those periods. The risk
term captures the difference between the magnitude of this
beneﬁt for the younger individual and its magnitude for the
older one. Since the older individual is sure to be alive at
the beginning of period Ai , while the younger individual is
not, this difference is negative.
Clearly, if income can increase with age, the magnitude
of the risk term may exceed that of the duration term, and
thus the utilitarian gain from saving the older individual
may be greater than that of saving the younger one. What
if constant income is assumed? With a constant income
proﬁle and a constant risk proﬁle, the duration term predominates and the utilitarian SVRR decreases with age.
More generally, it can be shown that if the income and risk
proﬁles are such that income does not increase with age
and survival probabilities do not increase with age, then
the utilitarian SVRR decreases with age. (See Appendix.)

3. Age effects and “priority for the young”
The effect of age on the SVRR has never been addressed
by the academic literature. In this Section, we analyze what
our model implies with respect to age effects on SVRR as
well as VSL by considering two individuals i and j, with
identical risk proﬁles and income proﬁles, but the ﬁrst older
than the second (Ai > Aj ).
Both SVRRi and VSLi are determined by individual i’s
status quo income proﬁle and risk proﬁle. (See Propositions 1a, 1b, 1c, 2b.) Thus, in analyzing the properties of
SVRRi and VSLi in this Section as well as Section 4, we will
not need to refer to incomes or probabilities, or to utilities
as a function of incomes and probabilities, other than status quo values. We therefore remove the “O” superscript
on incomes, probabilities, and utilities, which is implicit.
yi (t) denotes yiO (t), pi (t) denotes pO
(t), Vi denotes ViO , and
i
so forth. Further, we often drop subscripts on incomes or
probabilities where these are the same for i and j, e.g., y(t)
indicates yi (t) =yj (t).

3.2. Age effects and the ex ante prioritarian SVRR
A simple manipulation shows that SjEAP − SiEAP =



g  (Vj ) SjU − SiU

t=Aj

part is positive iff (SjU − SiU ) is positive. The second part of



 T

t=Ai



the formula here, SiU g  (Vj ) − g  (Vi ) , is a third term (“priority for the young”), which is always positive. Because
Vi > Vj (the older individual has greater expected lifetime
well-being) and g(·) is strictly concave, g (Vi ) < g (Vj ).
The intuition behind the formula is as follows. Ex ante
prioritarian social welfare, WEAP , is the sum of individuals’
transformed expected lifetime well-beings— transformed
by a strictly increasing and strictly concave g(·) function.
The effect of this transformation is to give greater social
weight to changes in expected lifetime well-being that
accrue to individuals at lower levels of expected lifetime
well-being. The differential ex-ante-prioritarian beneﬁt of
saving a younger rather than older individual reﬂects the
differential gains to expected lifetime well-being of saving the younger one (SjU − SiU ). But it also reﬂects the fact
that the younger individual has a lower level of expected
lifetime well-being and thus takes priority (g  (Vj ) > g  (Vi )).
We now deﬁne “Priority for the Young” more formally.

(t; Aj + 1)ˇt u(y(t)) +

(Ai ; Aj + 1) − 1



namely g  (Vj ) SjU − SiU , incorporates those terms. This

What are the relative magnitudes of SiU and SjU , for two
individuals of different ages (Ai > Aj ) but with identical risk
and income proﬁles? In other words, how does the utilitarian gain from saving an individual depend upon her
age?
It can be shown that SjU − SiU equals:





+ SiU g  (Vj ) − g  (Vi ) . We noted immedi-

ately above in discussing the utilitarian SVRR that the
quantity (SjU − SiU ) equals a positive “duration” term plus
a negative “risk”
 term. The ﬁrst part of the formula here,

3.1. Age effects and the utilitarian SVRR

Ai −1



(t; Ai + 1)ˇt u(y(t)).

(See Appendix.)
Thus the utilitarian SVRR decreases/is unchanged/
increases with age iff the value of this formula is positive/zero/negative.
The ﬁrst term in this formula (for short, the “duration
term”) is positive. By increasing the younger individual’s
current survival probability, we increase her chance of surviving the periods Aj , Aj +1, . . ., Ai – 1 in her life, and that
probability change for each such period yields an increment in expected lifetime well-being (by increasing her
chance of accruing consumption utility with respect to that

Deﬁnition 5. Priority for the Young: Consider any two
individuals i and j with identical risk proﬁles and income
proﬁles (pi (t) = pj (t) and yi (t) = yj (t) for all t), and such that
Ai > Aj . SVRR for a given SWF W(·) displays “Priority for
9
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the Young” iff the following is true for any such i and j:
SjU − SiU ≥ 0 ⇒ Sj − Si > 0. Similarly, VSL displays Priority
for the Young iff the following is true for any such i and j:
SjU − SiU ≥ 0 ⇒ VSLj − VSLi > 0.

live at least two periods). Ex ante prioritarianism gives
greater weight to a given increase in expected lifetime
well-being if it accrues to an individual at a lower level of
expected lifetime well-being, and so the younger patient
takes priority.
Not only does ex ante prioritarianism satisfy Priority for
the Young. We can prove a logically stronger result, namely
that the relative social value of risk reduction for young
versus old individuals is always greater with ex ante prioritarianism than with utilitarianism. (SjEAP /SiEAP ) > (SjU /SiU ).
If utilitarianism prefers to reduce the younger individual’s
risk (the utilitarian gain from saving her is greater), ex
ante prioritarianism has a yet greater degree of priority
for the young. If utilitarianism is indifferent (the utilitarian gains are equal), ex ante prioritarianism gives priority
to the young. Finally, although ex ante prioritarianism may
prefer to reduce the risk of the older individual (if the utilitarian gain from saving her is sufﬁciently greater), in this
case it always gives less priority to the older individual than
utilitarianism does.

Priority for the Young is a precise expression, using
the SVRR formalism, of the fair innings concept. Recall
our informal deﬁnition of “fair innings” in the Introduction (Section 1): As between a policy that produces a given
gain in expected lifetime well-being for a younger person,
and an otherwise-identical policy that produces the same
gain in expected lifetime well-being for an older person,
it is ethically better for society to undertake the ﬁrst policy. Recall too (Section 3.1) that the utilitarian SVRRi , SiU , is
equal to the per-unit gain to expected lifetime well-being
from reducing i’s current fatality risk. If i’s current survival
probability increases by pi , his expected lifetime wellbeing increases by pi × SiU .
If SVRRi for a given SWF W(·) displays Priority for the
Young, then it never assigns a smaller or equal value to
risk reduction for the younger individual if the utilitarian
risk-reduction value is larger for the younger than for the
older individual. (If the SWF displays Priority for the Young,
it follows that: SjU − SiU > 0 ⇒ Sj − Si > 0.) Further, if the
utilitarian risk-reduction values are equal, the SWF places
a larger value on risk reduction for the younger individual.
(If the SWF displays Priority for the Young, it also follows
that: SjU − SiU = 0 ⇒ Sj − Si > 0.).

Deﬁnition 6. Ratio Priority for the Young: Consider
any two individuals i and j with identical risk proﬁles and
income proﬁles (pi (t) = pj (t) and yi (t) = yj (t) for all t), and
such that Ai > Aj . SVRR for a given SWF W(·) displays “Ratio
Priority for the Young” iff the following is true for any such
i and j: (Sj /Si ) > (SjU /SiU ). Similarly, VSL displays Ratio Priority for the Young iff the following is true for any such i
and j: (VSLj /VSLi ) > (SjU /SiU ).

Proposition 3a. The Ex Ante Prioritarian SVRR displays
Priority for the Young.

Proposition 3b. The Ex Ante Prioritarian SVRR displays
Ratio Priority for the Young.

We can illustrate why ex ante prioritarianism satisﬁes
Priority for the Young using the Bognar (2015) thought
experiment presented in the Introduction. Consider two
patients, a younger patient j and an older patient i, who
are respectively at the beginning of periods two and three
of their lives. The maximum lifespan is three periods. The
patients have a common risk proﬁle, with p2 the common
survival probability for period two and p3 the common
survival probability for period three. Assume also that the
patients are equally well off, materially. Each faces the
same, constant, income proﬁle, with period utility normalized to 1 and a zero utility discount rate.
Finally, assume that p3 is close to zero, so that SjU ≈ SiU =
1 (as shown in note 30). Thus, if we have one dose of a drug
that can increase a patient’s current survival probability by
some ﬁxed increment, utilitarianism is indifferent between
giving the drug to the younger or the older patient; the utilitarian SVRRs are approximately equal. However, we easily
obtain that SjEAP ≈ g  (1 + p2 ) > SiEAP ≈ g  (2), by the concav-

Note that Ratio Priority for the Young is a logically
stronger property than Priority for the Young. If SVRR for a
given W(·) satisﬁes Ratio Priority for the Young, then necessarily it satisﬁes Priority for the Young; but the converse
is not true.31
Both Priority for the Young and Ratio Priority for the
Young are deﬁned relative to a utilitarian baseline. It is
an immediate logical consequence of these deﬁnitions that
the utilitarian SVRR displays neither property. This is not a
mathematical result, but simply the logical upshot of our
deﬁnitions, and so we don’t include the utilitarian SVRR
in the numbered propositions concerning Priority for the
Young and Ratio Priority for the Young.

31
In what follows, we assume that SVRR values are always positive. (As
remarked earlier, this is true, given the assumptions of our model, for SiU ,
SiEAP , and SiEPP ; see Section 2.3.) First, Ratio Priority for the Young implies
Priority for the Young. (1) If SjU − SiU > 0, then SjU /SiU > 1. By Ratio Priority

ity of g(·).30 Ex ante prioritarianism tells us to give the drug
to the younger individual, who has a lower expected lifetime well-being (it is uncertain whether she will survive
the second period, while the older patient will deﬁnitely

for the Young, Sj /Si >1. Thus Sj − Si >0. (2) If SjU − SiU = 0, then SjU /SiU = 1. By

Ratio Priority for the Young, Sj /Si >1. Thus Sj − Si >0.
Second, Priority for the Young does not imply Ratio Priority for the Young.
To see this, consider the case in which SjU − SiU < 0. In this case, Priority
for the Young places no constraint on the relative magnitudes of Sj and Si .
However, Ratio Priority for the Young requires that Sj /Si > SjU /SiU .

Vj , the expected lifetime well-being of the younger individual, is (1 −
p2 ) (1) + p2 (1 − p3 ) (2) + p2 p3 (3) = 1 + p2 + p2 p3 ; while Vi , the expected
lifetime well-being of the older individual, is (1 − p3 ) (2) + p3 (3) = 2 + p3 .
30

Thus, SjU =
p3 )and

SiEAP

∂Vj

∂p2

= 1 + p3 , while SiU =


= g (2 + p3 ).

∂Vi
∂p3

It’s also true, by directly parallel reasoning, that Ratio Priority for the
Young as deﬁned with respect to VSL is logically stronger than Priority for
the Young as deﬁned with respect to VSL. If VSL were to satisfy the ﬁrst, it
would satisfy the second, but not vice versa. As it happens, however, VSL
does not satisfy either. See Section 3.4.

= 1. SjEAP = g  (1 + p2 + p2 p3 )(1 +
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However, SiEPP = g(3) − g(2), while SjEPP ≈ g(2) − g(1) if p3

3.3. Age effects and the ex post prioritarian SVRR

is small.32 (If the older individual survives the period, her
expected transformed lifetime well-being is g(3); her transformed lifetime well-being if she does not is g(2). If the
younger individual survives the period, her expected transformed lifetime well-being, with p3 small, is approximately
g(2); her transformed lifetime well-being if she does not is
g(1).) By the concavity of g(·), g(3) − g(2) < g(2) − g(1).
We saw above that ex ante prioritarianism satisﬁes
not merely Priority for the Young but also the (logically
stronger) Ratio Priority for the Young. The same is true for
ex post prioritarianism.

It can be shown that SjEPP − SiEPP equals:

Ai −1
t=Aj

(t; Aj + 1)g(U(t))

T

+ ((Ai ; Aj + 1) − 1)



t=Ai

(t; Ai + 1)g(U(t))



+ g(U(Ai − 1)) − g(U(Aj − 1))

Although this formula is different from SjEAP − SiEAP , it
nonetheless reﬂects the same three factors. The ﬁrst term
of the formula is a positive “duration term,” reﬂecting the
increased chance for the younger individual of surviving
periods Aj through Ai − 1; the second term is a negative
“risk term,” reﬂecting the chance she will not survive to
period Ai ; and the third term is a positive “priority for the
young” term.
We saw above that the ex ante prioritarian SVRR displays “Priority for the Young”: it prefers to reduce the
younger individual’s risk even when utilitarianism is indifferent, and prefers to do so whenever utilitarianism does.
The same is true for the ex post prioritarian SWF.

Proposition 3d. The Ex Post Prioritarian SVRR Displays
Ratio Priority for the Young
3.4. Age effects and VSL
As is well known, the effect of age on VSL is ambiguous (Aldy and Viscusi, 2007; Hammitt, 2007). In our model,
age impacts VSL via its effect on the utilitarian SVRR (the
numerator of VSL), plus an additional effect: the change in
expected marginal utility of consumption (the denominator of VSL) with age.
As throughout this Section, let i and j be two individuals
with identical risk and income proﬁles, and such that Ai >
Aj . Let Ci = p(Ai )ˇAi u (y(Ai )) and similarly for Cj . Then VSLj
− VSLi equals:

Proposition 3c. The Ex Post Prioritarian SVRR displays
Priority for the Young.
The intuition for this result is as follows. As
explained earlier, the ex post prioritarian SVRR, SiEPP =
−g(Ui (Ai − 1)) +

T

i (t;Ai )
g(Ui (t)),
t=Ai pi (Ai )

is the difference

between individual i’s expected transformed lifetime
well-being conditional on surviving the current period,
and her transformed lifetime well-being if she does not
survive. Equivalently, it is the expected difference between
her transformed lifetime well-being conditional on surviving the current period (given her possible lifespans if she
does survive and their probabilities), and her transformed
lifetime well-being if she does not survive.
Consider now two individuals, one (j) younger than the
second (i), with a common risk and income proﬁle. The ex
post prioritarian SWF places less value on a risk reduction
for i than for j because i’s lifetime well-being if she dies
during the current period, U(Ai − 1), is greater than j’s if she
dies during the current period, U(Aj − 1)—and thus the very
same increase in lifetime well-being for the two individuals translates into a smaller change in transformed lifetime
well-being for i. Assume that i, if she survives the period,
has probability ␦ of realizing a level of lifetime well-being
which is U greater than her level of lifetime well-being
if she dies now. And assume that the same is true for j.
The utilitarian value of a chance ␦ of increment U is
the same for both individuals, namely ␦(U). The ex post
of a chance ␦ for individualj of increprioritarian value

ment U is ı g(U(Aj − 1) + U) − g(U(Aj − 1)) , while for
i it is ı (g(U(Ai − 1) + U) − g(U(Ai − 1))). The ﬁrst value is
greater than the second by virtue of the strict concavity of
g(·), because U(Aj − 1) < U(Ai − 1).
We can again use the Bognar (2015) thought experiment, now to illustrate why ex post prioritarianism satisﬁes
Priority for the Young. Following the example in Section
3.2 above, we have that utilitarianism is (approximately)
indifferent between giving the drug to the younger patient
and giving it to the older one, if p3 is small. SjU ≈ SiU = 1.


1  U
S − SiU + SiU
Cj j



1
1
−
Cj
Ci

Note that the expected marginal utility of consumption for the younger individual (Cj ) may be larger than for
the older individual (Ci )—which can occur if the younger
individual has less consumption and/or a greater current
survival probability. If Cj > Ci , the second term in the above
formula for VSLj − VSLi will be negative even if SjU = SiU .

Further, if SjU > SiU , the second term will again be negative
if Cj > Ci , and its magnitude may exceed that of the ﬁrst
term.
In short, it is not necessarily the case that SjU − SiU = 0 ⇒

VSLj − VSLi > 0; and it is not necessarily the case that SjU −
SiU > 0 ⇒ VSLj − VSLi > 0.
Proposition 3e.
Young.

VSL does not display Priority for the

In other words: BCA may prefer a risk reduction for
the older individual even if the utilitarian gains are equal,
indeed even if the utilitarian gain from saving the younger
one is larger.
Because Ratio Priority for the Young is a logically
stronger property than Priority for the Young33 —if VSL

32
Let Gj and Gi denote each individual’s expected transformed lifetime
well-being. Gj = (1−p2 )g(1) + p2 (1−p3 )g(2) + p2 p3 g(3). Gi = (1−p3 )g(2)

+ p3 g(3). Then SjEPP =
∂Gi
∂p3
33

11

= g(3) − g(2).
See note 31.

∂Gj
∂p2

= [g(2) − g(1)] + p3 [g(3) − g(2)], while SiEPP =
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Table 1
SVRRs, VSL, and Priority for the Young.

Utilitarian SVRR*
Ex Ante Prioritarian SVRR
Ex Post Prioritarian SVRR
VSL

Priority for the
Young

Ratio Priority
for the Young

—
Yes
Yes
No

—
Yes
Yes
No

standing these important differences, the two approaches
are alike in supporting the fair innings concept.
Our analysis also extends an important ﬁnding of Adler
et al. (2014). That article, as mentioned, used a singleperiod model which was not suited to study age effects.
What it did study was the effect of income and baseline risk
on the utilitarian, ex ante prioritarian, and ex post prioritarian SVRRs and on VSL. Here, Adler et al. (2014) found that
BCA and the SWF framework value risk reduction in significantly different ways. The present analysis conﬁrms that
ﬁnding, now with respect to age effects. By contrast with ex
ante and ex post prioritarian SVRRs, VSL does not display
Priority for the Young or Ratio Priority for the Young.

*
Because Priority for the Young and Ratio Priority for the Young are
deﬁned as a stronger preference for the young than the utilitarian preference, it is true by deﬁnition that the utilitarian SVRR doesn’t have these
properties—and so these cells in the table are left blank.

were to display the former, it would necessarily display the
latter—the proposition that VSL fails to display Priority for
the Young implies (by contraposition) that it fails to display
Ratio Priority for the Young.

4. The effects of income and baseline risk
We now consider how SVRR and VSL vary between individuals of the same age, but with different income or risk
proﬁles.

Proposition 3f. VSL does not display Ratio Priority for the
Young.

4.1. Sensitivity to income
3.5. Age effects: a summary

We consider ﬁrst whether SVRR and VSL increase,
decrease, or are unchanged by a single-period increment in
income. Two individuals i and j are identical in age (Ai = Aj ),
in their risk proﬁles, and in their income proﬁles except
that yj (t) = yi (t) + y, y > 0, for some single period t. The
period in which the individuals’ incomes differ can be the
current period, in which case t =Ai = Aj , or it can be a past or
future period. We determine whether SVRRj > SVRRi , SVRRj

Table 1 summarizes the results of our analysis of age
effects on the utilitarian, ex ante prioritarian, and ex post
prioritarian social values of risk reduction (SVRR), and on
VSL.
One “takeaway” from our analysis is that the concept
of prioritarianism, in both its ex ante and ex post variants,
provides a rigorous basis for the fair innings concept—as
precisely expressed by the properties Priority for the Young
and Ratio Priority for the Young. Ex ante prioritarian social
welfare, WEAP , is the sum of a strictly increasing and strictly
concave transformation function, g(·), applied to each
individual’s expected lifetime well-being. The ex ante prioritarian SVRR has the priority-for-the-young properties
because a given increment in expected lifetime well-being
is accorded greater social weight when provided to an individual at a lower level of expected lifetime well-being. The
ex post prioritarian SVRR has the priority-for-the-young
properties for a different reason. The ex post prioritarian SWF, WEPP , applies the g(·) function to individuals’
possible realized (not expected) lifetime well-being levels;
calculates expected transformed lifetime well-being for
each individual; and sums across individuals. As compared
to older persons with the same risk and income proﬁle,
younger persons face a lottery over possible realized lifetime well-being levels with a greater chance of lower
realized levels, and a smaller chance of higher realized
levels. A given increment in realized lifetime well-being
is accorded greater social weight by WEPP , if provided to
someone at a lower level of realized lifetime well-being.
For those familiar with the literature on prioritarianism
under uncertainty, it will be striking that both ex ante prioritarianism and ex post prioritarianism display Priority for
the Young and Ratio Priority for the Young. This literature
demonstrates a range of signiﬁcant axiomatic differences
between the two variants of prioritarianism (including, as
mentioned above, with respect to the ex ante Pareto and
stochastic dominance axioms). (Adler, 2012 ch. 7; Adler,
2019 app. J). The current analysis shows that, notwith-

= SVRRi , or SVRRj < SVRRi by examining the sign of
We proceed analogously for VSL.
We ﬁnd as follows.

∂Si
.
∂yi (t)

Proposition 4a. The utilitarian SVRR is unchanged by a
single-period increment to past income. It increases with a
single-period increment to present or future income.
Proposition 4b. The ex ante prioritarian SVRR decreases
with a single-period increment to past income. The effect
of a single-period increment to present income or future
income on the ex ante prioritarian SVRR is ambiguous.34
Proposition 4c. The ex post prioritarian SVRR decreases
with a single-period increment to past income. It increases
with a single-period increment to present or future income.
Proposition 4d. VSL is unchanged by a single-period
increment to past income. It increases with a single-period
increment to present or future income.
Although we do not prove the propositions here (see
Appendix), the following remarks may help to explain
them. Utilitarian SVRR. The utilitarian SVRR is “history independent.” As shown in the Appendix, the formula for SiU can

34
By “ambiguous” we mean the following. The comparative statics of
SVRR or VSL with respect to a parameter of interest (present income,
future income, permanent income, age, etc.) are “ambiguous” if (a) we
can ﬁnd some combination of the other parameters and strictly increasing
and strictly concave u(·) and g(·) such that SVRR or VSL is increasing in the
parameter of interest, and (b) some alternative combination of the other
parameters and the same u(·) and g(·) such that SVRR or VSL is decreasing
in the parameter of interest.
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be restated so as to make evident that it does not depend
upon individual i’s past survival probabilities or incomes.
In particular, then, if i and j are identical except that j has
a higher income than i in a single past period, SiU = SjU . The
utilitarian SVRR increases with a single-period increment
to present or future income because preventing the current death of an individual with greater present or future
income produces a larger gain in expected lifetime wellbeing.
Ex Ante Prioritarian SVRR. Unlike the utilitarian SVRR,
the ex ante prioritarian SVRR is “history dependent.” While
the formula for SiEAP does not depend upon i’s past survival probabilities, it does take account of her past income.
The explanation for why the ex ante prioritarian SVRR
decreases with a single-period increment to past income
is the following: If individuals i and j are identical except
that j has greater past income, then preventing either of
their deaths in the current period produces the same increment in expected lifetime well-being, but individual i has
a lower baseline level of expected lifetime well-being, thus
takes priority under WEAP .
Why does a single-period increment to present or future
income have an ambiguous effect on the ex ante prioritarian SVRR? In a nutshell, the reason is this: If the two
individuals are identical except that j has greater present
or future income than i, then i has a lower baseline level of
expected lifetime well-being, so takes priority under WEAP ;
but reducing her current risk produces a smaller increase in
expected lifetime well-being than reducing j’s current risk.
Whether WEAP prefers to reduce individual i’s current risk
or instead individual j’s depends upon the concavity of the
transformation function g(·). In particular, we show that
if g(·) is such that the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion
is always less than or equal to 1, a single-period increment to present or future income will increase the ex ante
prioritarian SVRR.
Ex Post Prioritarian SVRR. The ex post prioritarian
SVRR, too, is history dependent. The formula for SiEPP ,
like the formula for SiEAP , does not take account of i’s
past survival probabilities but does take account of her
past incomes. Further, like the ex ante prioritarian SVRR,
the ex post prioritarian SVRR decreases with a singleperiod increment to past income. However, unlike its ex
ante counterpart, the ex post prioritarian SVRR always
increases with a single-period increment to present or
future income.
The reason for the divergence between SiEAP and SiEPP as
regards sensitivity to present or future income is subtle.
The social value, as per WEPP , of preventing an individual
from dying during the current period is the expected difference between the transformed lifetime well-being of the
longer lives she might lead were she to survive the current
period, and the transformed lifetime well-being of her life
were it to end now. Increasing present or future income
increases that expected difference in transformed lifetime
well-being.
VSL. Because VSLi equals SiU divided by the expected
marginal utility of i’s current income, the comparative statics of VSL with respect to past and future income are
the same as for the utilitarian SVRR. Further, because the

utilitarian SVRR (the numerator of VSL) is increasing in current income, and the denominator is decreasing, VSL also
increases in current income—indeed more quickly than the
utilitarian SVRR.
Next, we consider the effect on SVRR and VSL of an
increment to permanent income. Two individuals i and j are
identical except that yj (t) = yi (t) + y, y > 0, for every
period t = 1 to T. We ﬁnd as follows.
Proposition 5a. The utilitarian SVRR increases with an
increment to permanent income.
Proposition 5b. The effect of an increment to permanent
income on the ex ante prioritarian SVRR is ambiguous.
Proposition 5c. The effect of an increment to permanent
income on the ex post prioritarian SVRR is ambiguous.
Proposition 5d. VSL increases with an increment to permanent income.
4.2. Sensitivity to baseline risk
We consider ﬁrst whether SVRR and VSL increase,
decrease, or are unchanged by a single-period increment
in survival probability. Two individuals i and j are identical except that pj (t) = pi (t) + q, q > 0, for some single
period t. We determine whether SVRRj > SVRRi , SVRRj =
SVRRi , or SVRRj < SVRRi by examining the sign of

∂Si
. We
∂pi (t)

proceed analogously for VSL.
None of the SVRRs, nor VSL, take account of past survival
probabilities. (The ex ante prioritarian and ex post prioritarian SVRRs are history-dependent because they take
account of past incomes; but their formulas do not also
depend upon past survival probabilities.) We therefore
focus on the case of a one-period change to present survival
probability (t = Ai = Aj ) or future survival probability.
Proposition 6a. The utilitarian SVRR is unchanged by a
single-period increment to present survival probability. It
increases with a single-period increment to future survival
probability.
Proposition 6b. The ex ante prioritarian SVRR decreases
with a single-period increment to present survival probability. The effect of a single-period increment to future
survival probability on the ex ante prioritarian SVRR is
ambiguous.
The ex post prioritarian SVRR is
Proposition 6c.
unchanged by a single-period increment to present
survival probability. It increases with a single-period increment to future survival probability.
Proposition 6d. VSL decreases with a single-period increment to present survival probability. It increases with a
single-period increment to future survival probability.
Again, see Appendix for proofs of the results. The following remarks may help to explain them.
Utilitarian SVRR. The formula for SiU can be rewritten
so that only future survival probabilities, not the current
survival probability pi (Ai ), show up in the formula. An
increment to current survival probability therefore has
no effect on the utilitarian SVRR. The utilitarian SVRR is
13
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increasing with a one-period increment to future survival
probability because preventing a current death produces a
bigger increase in expected lifetime well-being if the individual has a lower chance of dying in future periods.
Ex Ante Prioritarian SVRR. The ex ante prioritarian SVRR
is decreasing in current survival probability: An individual
with lower present survival probability has a lower level
of expected lifetime well-being, hence takes priority under
WEAP .
An individual with lower future survival probability
also has a lower level of expected lifetime well-being,
hence also takes priority under WEAP , but reducing her
current risk produces a smaller increase in expected lifetime well-being. Which effect predominates depends upon
the concavity of g(·). Hence the impact on the ex ante
prioritarian SVRR of a single-period increment to future
survival probability is ambiguous. We demonstrate, specifically, that if g(·) is such that the coefﬁcient of relative risk
aversion is always less than or equal to 1, a single-period
increment to future survival probability will increase the
ex ante prioritarian SVRR.
Ex Post Prioritarian SVRR. The ex post prioritarian SVRR is
unchanged by an increment to current survival probability.
(The formula for SiEPP can be rewritten so that pi (Ai ) drops
out of that formula.) It is increasing with a single-period
increment to future survival probability. As noted earlier,
the social value, as per WEPP , of preventing an individual
from dying during the current period is the expected difference between the transformed lifetime well-being of the
longer lives she might lead were she to survive the current
period, and the transformed lifetime well-being of her life
were it to end now. Increasing future survival probability
increases that expected difference in transformed lifetime
well-being.
VSL. VSL is the utilitarian SVRR divided by a denominator that increases with current survival probability, and
is independent of future survival probability. Because the
utilitarian SVRR is unchanged by a single-period increment
to current survival probability, VSL decreases with such an
increment. Because the utilitarian SVRR increases with a
single-period increment to future survival probability, VSL
also increases with such an increment.
Next, we consider the effect on SVRR and VSL of a permanent increment to survival probability. Two individuals
i and j are identical except that pj (t) = pi (t) + q, q > 0, for
every present and future period t (for every t ≥ Ai = Aj ). We
ﬁnd as follows.

4.3. Income and baseline risk: summary
The comparative statics of the SVRRs and VSL with
respect to income and survival probability are summarized
in Table 2.
Much about this table is noteworthy. First, timing
matters. Whether individuals who differ with respect to
income, or with respect to survival probability, have divergent SVRRs or VSL depends upon whether the income
or survival probability difference occurs in the past, the
present, or the future. Consider the columns for “income:
single-period difference” and “survival probability: singleperiod difference.” The following is true for each of the
three SVRRs and for VSL: (1) its comparative statics
(unchanged, increasing, decreasing, or ambiguous) are not
the same for past, current, and future-period differences
in income, and moreover (2) its comparative statics are
not the same for current and future-period differences in
survival probability.
Second, the prioritarian SVRRs, ex ante and ex post, are
history-dependent—speciﬁcally, with respect to income.
Each is decreasing with a one-period change to past
income—by contrast with the utilitarian SVRR and VSL,
which are independent of past income.
Third, this table conﬁrms a key ﬁnding of Adler et al.
(2014), using a simpler, single-period model: the manner
in which VSL values risk reduction is not robust to a change
in social evaluation framework. VSL differs, in some significant way, from each of the SVRRs. VSL and the utilitarian
SVRR have the same comparative statics with respect to
income, but not survival probability. VSL and the prioritarian SVRRs have different comparative statics with respect
to both income and survival probability.35
Fourth, the choice within the prioritarian family,
between ex ante and ex post prioritarian approaches, is
seen to be signiﬁcant. The ex ante prioritarian SVRR is
decreasing in current survival probability and ambiguous with respect to future survival probability, while
the ex post prioritarian SVRR is independent of current survival probability and increasing in future survival
probability. Both SVRRs are decreasing in past income,
but: the ex ante prioritarian SVRR is ambiguous with
respect to current and future income, while the ex post
prioritarian SVRR is increasing with current and future
income.36
This table, of course, concerns comparative statics: the
direction of impact on VSL and the SVRRs of changes in
risk and survival probability. It doesn’t show the magnitude
of impact—another type of difference between the various
approaches. This difference will emerge in the following
section, where we empirically estimate VSL and the SVRRs
for the U.S. population.

Proposition 7a. The utilitarian SVRR increases with a permanent increment to survival probability.
Proposition 7b. The effect of a permanent increment to
survival probability on the ex ante prioritarian SVRR is
ambiguous.
Proposition 7c. The ex post prioritarian SVRR increases
with a permanent increment to survival probability.

35
Except that, if g(·) has a coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion less than
or equal to one, the comparative statics of the ex ante prioritarian SVRR
with respect to survival probability are the same as VSL.
36
See Adler and Treich (2017), ﬁnding signiﬁcant differences between
ex ante and ex post prioritarianism in a model of intergenerational consumption allocation.

Proposition 7d. The effect of a permanent increment to
survival probability on VSL is ambiguous.
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Table 2
Comparative Statics of SVRRs and VSL with respect to Income and Survival Probability.

Utilitarian SVRR

Ex Ante Prioritarian SVRR

Ex Post Prioritarian SVRR

VSL

Income: Single-period
difference

Income: permanent
difference

Survival probability:
single-period difference

Survival probability:
permanent difference

Past period: Unchanged
Current period:
Increasing
Future period: Increasing
Past period: Decreasing
Current period: Ambiguous*
Future period: Ambiguous*
Past period: Decreasing
Current period: Increasing
Future period: Increasing
Past period: Unchanged
Current period: Increasing
Future period: Increasing

Increasing

Current period: Unchanged
Future period: Increasing

Increasing

Ambiguous

Current period: Decreasing
Future period: Ambiguous*

Ambiguous

Ambiguous

Current period: Unchanged
Future period: Increasing

Increasing

Increasing

Current period: Decreasing
Future period: Increasing

Ambiguous

*
The ex ante prioritarian SVRR increases with a single-period increment to current or future income, and increases with a single-period increment to
future survival probability, if g(·) is such that its coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion is always less than or equal to 1.

5. SVRRs and VSL for the U.S. population

the prioritarian SVRRs, we used an “Atkinson” (isoelastic)
SWF with both a moderate inequality-aversion parameter
(␥ = 1) and a higher such parameter (␥ = 2). This yields four
different prioritarian SVRRs (namely ex post or ex ante,
with ␥ = 1 or 2). (On the attractive axiomatic properties
of the Atkinson subfamily of prioritarian SWFs, see Adler,
2012, ch. 5; Adler, 2019, pp. 154–58.)
The panels in Fig. 1 display the SVRRs and VSL as a function of age, for each of the ﬁve percentiles. The results are
normalized so that 1 represents the SVRR or VSL for a 60
year old, median income individual.
As the panels show, the utilitarian SVRR decreases with
age within each percentile (even though this is not theoretically required—see Section 3.1). The prioritarian SVRRs also
decrease with age within each percentile (as is required by
Priority for the Young and Ratio Priority for the Young given
that the utilitarian SVRR does39 ).
The utilitarian SVRR increases with income: at every
age, individuals in higher income percentiles have larger
SVRRs. This is reversed for the prioritarian SVRRs with
␥ = 2; at every age, SVRR decreases with income. ␥ = 1
is an intermediate case, in which the utilitarian preference for reducing the risk of those with higher income is
almost neutralized but not reversed. Note here that the
lines displaying the ex ante and ex post prioritarian SVRR
as a function of age are virtually the same for all income
percentiles. Thus the prioritarian SVRRs with moderate
inequality aversion conform to widely held views regarding lifesaving policies, namely that the young should take
priority but income should make no difference.40

In this Section, we illustrate the SVRR and VSL concepts,
and estimate their relative magnitudes, by calculating SVRR
and VSL for cohorts of individuals characterized by varying risk proﬁles, income proﬁles and ages. The income and
survival data for this exercise derive from the actual U.S.
population. The U.S. Census Bureau collects data on the
income distribution by age range. We used this to estimate
the percentiles of the income distribution for each age.
Assuming zero mobility (movement across percentiles), we
determined a lifetime income proﬁle for the 10th , 30th , 50th ,
70th , and 90th percentiles of the U.S. income distribution.
The lifetime risk proﬁle for each of these ﬁve percentiles
was based upon the actual U.S. population survival curve,
and then adjusted to reﬂect income differences in life
expectancy.37
We calculated the utilitarian SVRR, ex ante and ex post
prioritarian SVRRs, and VSL by age for each of the ﬁve percentiles. As per the analysis in Sections 2,3 and 4, we did so
on the assumption that an individual’s annual consumption
in a given year is just her income. A logarithmic utility function was used.38 The utility discount rate was set to 0. For

37
Speciﬁcally, data on the U.S. income distribution was taken
from the Current Population Survey (CPS) income tables. See
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/
cps-pinc.html. We used the table PINC 01 1 1 1 (total work experience,
both sexes, all races) for 2016. A fourth degree polynomial in age was
ﬁtted to the data. We assume that income for ages 20−24 is the same
as for ages 25−30 and that income for ages 75−100 is the same as for
ages 70−74. The U.S. population survival curve was taken from the life
tables compiled by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. See
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/life tables.htm. We used the 2014
life tables (National Vital Statistics Reports, vol. 66, no. 4, August 24,
2017).
A lifetime risk proﬁle for the ﬁve percentiles was determined as follows.
We adjusted the U.S. population survival curve, as taken from the life table,
by multiplying the annual mortality risk for each age by a scaling factor to
reﬂect the individual’s income. These scaling factors were, respectively,
1.5, 1.2, 1, 0.9, and 0.7 for, respectively, the 10th , 30th , 50th , 70th , and 90th
percentiles of income. The scaling factors were taken from Adler (2017,
appendix C), who in turn estimated them to match ﬁndings by Chetty et al.
(2016) regarding differences in life expectancy across income classes.
38
Speciﬁcally, u(c) = ln c − ln czero , czero = $1000, which is roughly the
World Bank level of extreme poverty. See Adler (2017, appendix C).

39
Assume that the utilitarian SVRR decreases with age among a group
of individuals with the same risk and income proﬁle. That is, for every
age A, if Aj = A and Ai = A + 1 and i and j are in the group, then SjU > SiU .

Since the prioritarian SVRRs satisfy Priority for the Young, it follows that
SjEAP > SiEAP and SjEPP > SiEPP . Because Ratio Priority for the Young implies
Priority for the Young (see note 31), this also follows from Ratio Priority
for the Young.
40
Dolan et al. (2005, p. 202), reviewing the survey literature regarding
the public’s preferences for the allocation of health care, ﬁnds that “most
studies suggest that health gains to the old are weighted less.” Dolan et al.
ﬁnd some studies in which respondents prefer to allocate resources to
those in lower socioeconomic groups. However, Emanuel et al. (2020, p.
2051), discussing the allocation of scarce medical resources in the Covid15
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Fig. 1. SVRRs and VSL by Age and Income Percentile for the U.S. Population.

VSL decreases with age for individuals above 40. At
earlier ages, for some income percentiles, VSL displays
the inverted U (“hump”) shape often described in the lit-

erature. (Aldy and Viscusi, 2007; Hammitt, 2007; Viscusi,
2018, ch. 5).
The most striking difference between VSL and all the
SVRRs concerns income effects: VSL increases with income
at all ages, and much more steeply than even the utilitarian
SVRR. This can be observed in Fig. 1, and is displayed very
clearly in Fig. 2, which shows the ratio between SVRR or
VSL at the 90th and 10th income percentiles as a function of
age. That ratio is between 0.5 and 3 for all the SVRRs, while

19 pandemic, and citing the public health literature, write: “Consensus
exists that an individual person’s wealth should not determine who lives
or dies.”
16
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Fig. 2. Ratio of SVRRs and VSL at 90th Percentile Income to SVRRs and VSL at 10th Percentile Income by Age.

between the ex ante or ex post prioritarian SVRR of an
individual of each age and a 60-year-old’s ex ante or ex
post prioritarian SVRR exceeds the comparable ratio for the
utilitarian SVRR.41
6. Conclusion
This Article has undertaken an extensive analysis of the
social value of risk reduction (SVRR). SVRR is the linchpin concept for applying a social welfare function (SWF)
to one major policy domain: fatality risk regulation. SVRRi
is deﬁned as ∂W . It is the marginal change in social value, as
∂pi

determined by SWF W(·), per unit of risk reduction for individual i. We investigate SVRR for three major SWFs (utilitarian, ex ante prioritarian, and ex post prioritarian), using
a lifetime model that allows us to differentiate individuals
by age, lifetime risk proﬁle, and lifetime income proﬁle.
Economists have intensively investigated the SWF
framework in certain policy arenas, such as taxation and
climate policy. However, the application of SWFs to the
domain of risk regulation has been little studied. Our
analysis demonstrates, in detail, how the social weight
placed upon a reduction in a given individual’s fatality risk
depends upon the functional form of the SWF. In their
comparative statics with respect to income and baseline
risk, the three SVRRs differ signiﬁcantly from each other.
At the same time, each of the SVRRs deviates substantially from VSL—the valuation concept for risk reduction
that is used by beneﬁt-cost analysis (BCA), currently the
dominant methodology in governmental practice and in
applied economics. In a nutshell, then, our analysis shows
that a rigorous intellectual apparatus with deep roots in
welfare economics—the SWF framework—values individual risk reduction in a manner quite different from BCA. In
an empirical exercise, we conﬁrm this ﬁnding.
Moreover, we show that the “fair innings” concept, popular in the public health literature, has a ﬁrm, formal basis

Fig. 3. Fair Innings Premium (percent).

generally exceeds 20 for VSL. (In Fig. 2, the abbreviation “U”
indicates the utilitarian SVRR; “EAP 1” and “EAP 2” the ex
ante prioritarian SVRR with ␥ = 1 and 2, respectively; and
“EPP 1” and “EPP 2” the ex post prioritarian SVRR with ␥
= 1 and 2, respectively. The “EAP” and “EPP” abbreviations
are also used in Fig. 3.)
Our exercise here also sheds light on the U.S. government’s practice of employing a single, population-average
VSL to value risk reduction (Robinson, 2007). Such an
approach is not only inconsistent with the theory of
BCA—as Fig. 1 shows, VSL varies by age and income—but
also with the SWF framework. All of the SVRRs vary, at least,
by age, and some by both age and income.
Finally (see Fig. 3) we estimate a “fair innings premium.”
Recall that both ex ante prioritarian and ex post prioritarian SVRRs have the property of Ratio Priority for the
Young: the ratio of prioritarian SVRRs, between a younger
and older person with the same lifetime income and risk
proﬁle, is always larger than the ratio of utilitarian SVRRs.
Fig. 3 shows the magnitude of this difference in ratios. For
individuals of the median income proﬁle and associated
risk proﬁle, we calculate the percentage by which the ratio

41

That

is,

we

U
EPP
[(SjEPP /S60
)/(SjU /S60
)]

17

calculate

U
EAP
[(SjEAP /S60
)/(SjU /S60
)] − 1

− 1 for each age j.
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within welfare economics. Speciﬁcally, both the ex ante prioritarian and ex post prioritarian SVRRs satisfy axioms of
Priority for the Young and Ratio Priority for the Young. In
effect, a younger person takes priority over an older person with respect to risk reduction even when the gains
in expected lifetime well-being are equal. (By contrast,
BCA does not support the fair innings concept; a younger
individual may have a lower VSL even when the gains
to expected lifetime well-being are equal.) As far as we
are aware, this Article is the ﬁrst to provide a theoretical
interpretation of “fair innings” using the tools of welfare
economics.
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